Ex-post average utilitarianism can be worse for all affected

• Authors: Dean Spears, Johan E. Gustafsson
• Published in: R&R at Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
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Abstract

According to Ex-Post Average Utilitarianism, prospect 𝑋 is at least as good as prospect 𝑌 if and only if the expected average well-being is at least as great in 𝑋 as in 𝑌. Relative to the ex-ante approach of taking the average of peoples’ expectations, the ex-post approach has the advantage of not needing well-defined expectations of well-being for contingent people — people who exist in some but not all states of nature. Nevertheless, we show that Ex-Post Average Utilitarianism can oppose the interests of all affected people. Moreover, we show this without relying on any comparisons of expectations of well-being for contingent people.